The politics of opinion assignment: a conditional logit model with varying choice set by Gschwend, Thomas & King, Chad M.
www.ssoar.info
The politics of opinion assignment: a conditional
logit model with varying choice set
Gschwend, Thomas; King, Chad M.
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Gschwend, T., & King, C. M. (2002). The politics of opinion assignment: a conditional logit model with varying choice
set.. Mannheim: Universität Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES). https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-430858
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
The Politics of Opinion Assignment:
A Conditional Logit Model with varying Choice Set.∗
Thomas Gschwend
Mannheimer Zentrum fuer Europaeische Sozialforschung (MZES)
University of Mannheim
68131 Mannheim, Germany
Thomas.Gschwend@mzes.uni-mannheim.de
Chad M. King
Department of Political Science
Stony Brook University
Stony Brook, NY 11794-4392
chking@ic.sunysb.edu
October 26, 2002
∗The authors wish to thank Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck for providing their replication data. We
also wish to thank Stanley Feldman, Bradford Jones, Jeffrey Segal, Florian Heiss, Paul Thurner, Ulrich
Kohler, Jack Buckley, Jeff Gill and Scott Graves for their helpful comments and assistance. The authors’
names are listed alphabetically and any errors or omissions are solely their responsibility.
ABSTRACT
This note replicates and extends Chapter 2 of Forrest Maltzman, James F.
Spriggs and Paul J. Wahlbeck’s (henceforth: MSW) “Crafting Law on the Supreme
Court” (2000). Using a conditional logit model, the authors test the effects of
both choice-specific and chooser-specific variables on majority opinion assignment
on the United States Supreme Court during Chief Justice Burger’s tenure. The
authors find that the effect of ideology, as well as other variables, is conditioned
on both case facts as well as justices’ attributes. In this note, we take issue with
the authors’ specification of the model, specifically their failure to include choice-
specific, i.e. the justices, constants. Below we argue for the statistical necessity
of the inclusion of these controls and reassess the original theoretical model with
the appropriate statistical specification. We first show that the failure to include
these constants will yield biased estimates. We then test if the authors’ sub-
stantive findings are robust to the correct specification of their original model.
While we successfully replicate the original model (yielding biased estimates),
we generally find that MSW’s core findings, although confirmed, are diminished
when correctly estimated.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Conditional logit models have increased in both popularity and employment in political
science because of the ease of their implementation in most statistical software as well as
their appropriateness to fundamental theoretical questions. These models allow scholars to
simultaneously test the effects of not only choice-specific characteristics, but chooser-specific
characteristics as well. In this note, we raise a more general methodological issue with
specifications of conditional logit models that is not commonly appreciated in the field of
judicial politics and in the discipline at large. We show that the way these models are often
specified yields biased estimates.
In an important and award-winning1 work by MSW, the authors use this model to esti-
mate the causes of majority opinion assignment on the Supreme Court. While the authors
find that several conditional relationships influence assignment decisions, we question the
manner in which they estimated their model. If the authors’ substantive findings are robust,
they should withstand an extension by correctly specifying their original model. While we
successfully replicate the original model (yielding biased estimates), we generally find that
the MSW’s core findings although confirmed, are diminished when correctly estimated.
2. SUPREME COURT OPINION ASSIGNMENT
Why is the assignment process of majority opinions so important to understanding the
Supreme Court? The majority opinion provides more than just the answer as to who “wins”
the case; it provides the reasoning for that outcome. Often times the written opinion creates
or interprets legal standards that will be important not only to the litigants but to the public
as well as lower courts and other branches of government. The majority opinion affects not
1The 2000 C. Herman Pritchett Award.
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only the case it is written for but how future cases will be decided as well as the future
behavior of a variety of actors. Because the actual text and language of opinion matters,
choosing which justice writes that opinion matters too (Epstein and Knight, 1998). Justices
frequently differ in the legal standards and reasoning that they employ in their decisions.
This suggests that given the same case, two justices who agree on the outcome of the case
might differ in how to arrive at that common outcome. Thus, who is assigned a given opinion
is extremely important. MSW’s work provides a comprehensive and detailed examination of
opinion assignment on the Burger Court. Their model reveals that ideology affects opinion
assignment, but only under conditions of minimum winning coalitions and highly salient
cases. They also find that non-ideological variables matter. The assigning Chief Justice was
found to be concerned with equity of assignments, the expertise of justices in the issue area
of the case, as well as the burden of the existing workload of justices at the time of the
assignment. These findings lead the authors to conclude that the assignment process is best
summarized as a “Collegial Game”.
3. REPLICATION OF MSW’S RESULTS
In Table 1, we replicate the results from MSW’s original analysis of Burgers opinion as-
signments based upon their conditional logit estimation. As just discussed, ideology affects
opinion assignment, but only when it is conditioned on a few independent variables; polit-
ical salience, the closeness to the end of the term and as the size of the original majority
coalition increases. Workload and equity matter as well, as the Chief Justice seems to prefer
assignment to justices who have fewer decisions to write at the time of assignment and those
who receive fewer assignments the same day from associate justices. Lastly, expertise is
significant as justices who are experts in the issue areas of the case are more likely to be as-
signed the opinion. These findings lead MSW to conclude that the Chief Justices assignments
3
Table 1: Replication of MSW’s Results: Conditional Logit Model of Opinion Assignment on
the Burger Court.


 
Independent Variables Coef. Std.Err. p-value
Ideology 0.017 0.006 0.002
Self-Assignment (= j1) -0.167 0.086 0.051
Ideology X Winning Margin -0.004 0.001 0.001
Ideology X Political Salience -0.003 0.001 0.001
Ideology X Legal Salience -0.006 0.006 0.357
Self-Assignment X Political Salience -0.018 0.021 0.392
Self-Assignment X Legal Salience 0.287 0.246 0.243
Equity -0.095 0.035 0.006
Expertise 0.066 0.026 0.010
Freshman -0.072 0.096 0.454
Freshman X Case Complexity -0.048 0.097 0.617
Workload -0.107 0.027 0.000
Ideology X End of Term 0.000 0.000 0.060
N 12873   
PCP 0.190   
PRE 0.042   
are based upon not just ideological concerns, but also upon institutional and political factors.
4. CORRECTION OF THE MSW MODELING STRATEGY
In this section we extend and improve upon MSW’s modelling strategy. In general we agree
with the authors that a conditional logit (CL) model is a reasonable strategy to model
opinion assignment for the following two reasons. First, a CL model allows the choice set
– the set of particular justices in the majority of the initial conference vote – to vary from
case to case. Second, compared to alternative discrete choice modeling strategies, at the
estimation stage a CL model brings to bear a priori more substantive information about the
choice process under investigation – namely that for every case there is one and only one
justice who is assigned to write the opinion – therefore mirroring the process driving opinion
assignment more realistically.
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The authors’ theory is operationalized by two types of covariates: (1) legal case-specific
variables that vary only across cases in the data set but are fixed across justices (e.g.,
Political and Legal Salience, Winning Margin, Case Complexity and End of Term), and (2)
alternative-specific variables that also vary across choice alternatives in the model, i.e., the
justices in the majority (e.g., Ideology, Equity, Expertise, Workload).
Typically, scholars employ a CL model in order to estimates alternative-specific effects
on the likelihood of observing a particular choice behavior (Alvarez and Nagler, 1998, 66-71).
The traditional conditional logit set-up, however, can be modified and “tricked” into a mixed
version to model characteristics of the individual (cases) along with characteristics of the
alternatives (justices) at the same time.
Following random utility theory we assume that individuals have utility functions in order
to describe and compute their gain from choosing one alternative over the other. The utility
for individual i (i = 1, . . . , N) associated with the choice of j (j = 1, . . . , J) is given by
Uij = z
′
ijα + x
′
iβj + ²ij (1)
whereby zij (including 1 as its first element) is the vector of measured characteristics of
(alternative) justice j by individual case i. These characteristics vary across justices (choice
alternatives), like Ideology, Equity, Expertise. Thus, we call them justice-specific charac-
teristics. Furthermore, α is the vector of estimated coefficients indicating the impact of
justice-specific characteristics on the likelihood of getting an assignment. Note there is only
one set of coefficients (including J − 1 justice specific constants). We will call this the
“CL-part” of the model since it resembles the typical conditional logit set-up.
Moreover the second part of the utility function represents what we call the “MNL-part”
of the model since it resembles a typical multinomial logit (MNL) set-up. xi (including 1
as its first element) is a vector of measured characteristics of the individual case i. These
case-specific characteristics, for instance Political and Legal Salience, Winning Margin, Case
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Complexity and End of Term, vary across cases but are fixed across the choice alternatives
– namely the justices. For every case specific variable the model estimates J − 1 sets of
coefficients βj, since one set of coefficients is (typically for discrete-choice models) set to 0
in order to identify the model (Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Long and Freese, 2001). Thus βj
represents the vector of estimated case-specific characteristics of justice j relative to justice
Burger. Overall for J justices we get J−1 sets of coefficients (including J−1 justice-specific
constants) as in a typical MNL model set-up.
It is further assumed that the selection rule is simply to choose the alternative from which
one gets the highest utility gain. The probabilities associated with assigning the opinion in
case i to justice j can be written as
Pr(yi = j | zij, xi) = Pij =
exp(z′ijα + x
′
iβj)∑
j∈Ci exp(z
′
ijα + x
′
iβj)
(2)
thereby allowing the choice set Ci to vary from case to case accounting for the fact that the
likelihood of an opinion assignment is calculated conditional on the nature of the majority
coalition that defines the choice set of the assignment process (hence the name conditional
logit).
Simply specifying case-specific covariates as justice-specific variables does not do the
“trick” because they do not vary across justices and hence will be dropped if estimated by
standard software packages like STATA or LIMDEP. Nevertheless, as footnote 29 in the
MSW text notes, this is apparently what the authors did. In order to set-up a mixed version
of the CL model correctly, one has to specify the “MNL-part” appropriately. Since we are
interested in how case-specific characteristics apply to the justices, we must interact these
variables with j dummy variables for the justices (thereby using Chief Justice Burger as the
baseline).
A mixed version of a CL model is a combination of a “standard CL-part”, i.e. consisting
of justice-specific covariates that vary across alternatives (justices), and a“MNL-part” con-
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sisting of J − 1 dummy variables as choice specific constants together with its multiplicative
terms based on all case-specific covariates (Greene, 2000; Long and Freese, 2001; Powers and
Xie, 2000).
The estimated fixed effects represented by the justice-specific dummy variables indicate
the average impact of unobserved (either case- or justice-specific) factors (Heiss, 2002, 229)
on the decision makers’ utility difference of assigning to himself versus any other alternative
justices respectively that are not accounted for in the model. If the contribution of these
unobserved factors on the likelihood of getting an assignment is non-zero and these fixed
effects are not included in the systematic component of the model, then they are consequently
absorbed into the stochastic component (error term) of the model thereby violating the
assumption of a zero mean of an extreme value distributed error term (Train, 1986). This
yields biased estimates.
More formally let us consider what happens if we exclude the fixed effects, represented
by the justice-specific constants, from the systematic component. From the correct model
specification in equation 1 we get
Uij = z˜
′
ijα + 1iαj + x˜
′
iβ + 1iβj + ²ij (3)
= z˜′ijα + x˜
′
iβ + (1iαj + 1iβj + ²ij) (4)
= z˜′ijα + x˜
′
iβ + ²˜ij (5)
Thus, the (unobserved) factors 1iαj and 1iβj are consequently absorbed into the stochastic
component (error term) of the model, whereby ²˜ij denotes the new error term. By assumption
the stochastic component of a CL model is distributed extreme value, i.e., it has zero mean.
Because equation 1 represents the correct specification by assumption we know that E(²ij) =
0. But what is the expectation of the new error term ²˜ij including the variance usually picked
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up by 1iαj and 1iβj?
E(²˜ij) = E(1iαj + 1iβj + ²ij) (6)
= E(1iαj + 1iβj) + E(²ij) = 1iαj + 1iβj + 0 (7)
Hence, we get unbiased estimates, if and only if
E(²˜ij) = 0 ⇐⇒ 1i(αj + βj) = 0 (8)
Again, if choice- or here justice-specific constants are not explicitly in a CL model, all unob-
served factors get absorbed into the error term. The model will then violate the assumption
of a zero mean of the extreme value distributed error term of (conditional) logit models and
yields biased coefficients if the unobserved factors are significantly different from zero (Train,
1986, 24-25). Including these fixed effects in the model relaxes an overly restrictive assump-
tion that the contribution of all unobserved factors on the likelihood is non-zero. Using a
similar argument one can show that one also gets nonsensical estimates if the main effects
of included interactions are omitted.
In fact, MWS apply such a mixed model estimation strategy to the data because they
derived hypotheses that relate to characteristics of the cases, attributes of the justices in
the majority coalition as well as conditional relationships thereof. However, the MSW mod-
eling strategy is plagued by both problems – as is related work on opinion assignment in
the Rehnquist Court published in the American Journal of Political Science by two of the
authors (Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 1996). They neither include the justice-specific con-
stants nor do they correctly set-up the “MNL-part” of their model. Particularly, their
Self-Assignment dummy is obviously collinear with an alternative specific constant for Chief
Justice Burger. Therefore, in order to test hypotheses about self-assignment in political and
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legally salient cases (the so-called Case Importance Hypotheses 2a and b in Maltzman and
Wahlbeck (1996)), for instance, the model must have the correctly specified “MNL-part”.
Political and Legal Salience are case-specific variables, therefore the product terms with (13-
1) alternative specific dummy variables (taking justice Burger as baseline) are expected to
be negative in all 12 sets of estimates of the “MNL-part” of the model.
Furthermore, in order to specify interaction terms, for instance, Ideology and Winning
Margin, the component parts of these interaction terms must also be included. Setting up
the “MNL-part” of their model correctly by multiplying the case-specific component parts by
each justice-specific dummy variable will create the necessary justice-specific main effects (for
13-1 alternatives). Thus, these main effects vary across alternatives (justices) and, hence,
do not get dropped out. The same logic holds for all the other interactive effects included
in the original model.
Every CL model can be written as a generalized linear model (GLM). Since the (multi-
nomial) link function (Liao, 1994, 60-61) is smooth and invertible it can be always passed
back to the left-hand side of the equation. Therefore, interpreting interaction effects becomes
analogous to the case of linear models (Friedrich, 1982; Gill, 2001) keeping in mind that the
right-hand side is then the log odds of getting an assignment for a particular justice versus
the baseline (here: CJ Burger). The conditional slope of an independent variable x1 (say,
Winning Margin) if interacted with x2 (say, Ideology) does not only depend on the size of
its main effect βˆ1. Rather the slope of x1 is a composite of its main effect and x2 weighted
by the size of the interaction effect βˆ3, i.e. (βˆ1 + βˆ3x2) x1.
What does this mean substantively? Excluding, for instance, the main effect forWinning
Margin from the equation – as the authors’ do – effectively constrains its estimated coefficient
βˆ1 to zero. Thus the substantive impact of Winning Margin is underestimated if βˆ1 has the
same sign as βˆ3x2 or is overestimated otherwise.
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Figure 1: A Comparison of the impact of the Size of Majority Coalition for the MSW model
specification and our correct model specification: The average simulated impact of the size of
the majority coalition on the likelihood of getting an assignment conditional on ideological
distance is graphed together with its estimated 90% confidence interval. The upper curve
comes from the MWS model specification.
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In the following figure 1 we simulate the averaged slope coefficient2 across levels of Ideology
and graph it. The upper curve comes from the authors’ model specification. The extent of
the bias is transparent by comparing predictions with the correct model specification (the
lower curve). The upper curve is not statistically different from zero even for a one-tailed
test with α = .05 for small ideological distances implying that Winning Margin has no
effect on the (log odds) likelihood of getting an assignment. In general both the simulated
slopes for both models do not vary too much across levels of Ideology. Thus, the substantive
impact of the hypothesized interaction between Winning Margin and Ideology is small. The
predictions of both models do differ significantly. In fact only at the end of the Ideology-scale
(at about 50) do both curves overlap. All other interactions can be interpreted analogously.
In Table 2, we report the results of the correctly specified CL model where we included
constants, the fixed effects created by justice specific dummy variables, and all necessary
component parts of the interaction terms MSW specified in the original model. This allows
us to estimate political and legal salience effects for all justices versus Chief Justice Burger
as a baseline instead of excluding them. We, therefore, are able to directly test whether
self-assignment is particularly predominant in these cases.
Starting with a correctly specified model we can easily interpret the estimation results and
evaluate MWS’s Case Importance Hypotheses that Burger is more likely to assign politically
and legally salient cases to himself. If this were true we should find significantly negative
coefficients for political and legal salience in every set of estimates. In general, however, this
is not true. Politically salient cases, according to this model, are not treated differently than
non-salient cases, holding everything else equal. None of the coefficients for political salience
is significantly different from zero while eight out of twelve of them do not even have the
2The averaged conditional slope of Winning Margin is (βˆ1 + βˆ3 Ideology). It is averaged because βˆ1 is
the average coefficient across all 12 estimated coefficients of the comparison of every particular justice on
the court versus the baseline (CJ Burger). Note βˆ3 is not averaged because only one coefficient is estimated
anyway.
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-
0.3
45

0.1
00

0.0
01

-
0.1
84

0.1
03

0.0
72



Ca
se

Co
m
ple
xit
y
-
0.1
74

0.1
08

0.1
07

0.1
76

0.0
92

0.0
56

-
0.1
84

0.1
29

0.1
54

-
0.0
18

0.1
55

0.9
08



En
do
fT
er
m



-
0.0
03

0.0
01

0.0
73

-
0.0
03

0.0
01

0.0
78

-
0.0
02

0.0
02

0.3
51

-
0.0
03

0.0
02

0.2
08

Table 2: Corrected Specification: A Conditional Logit Model of Opinion Assignment on the
Burger Court.
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expected sign. For legally salient cases the Case Importance Hypotheses is also generally not
supported because a test that all 12 Legal Salience coefficients in Table 2 are jointly zero
cannot be rejected (p > .25). We only find significant self-assignment effects compared to
Justice Stevens. Our estimate indicates that Burger is (1/exp(−1.642) = 5.2) approximately
5 times more likely to assign to himself than to Stevens. Thus apart from Justice Stevens
in legally salient cases, we cannot conclude that there is a significant difference between
Burger’s choice of assigning to himself compared to the associate justices, in either legally
or politically salient cases.
Nevertheless, the political salience of cases has a moderating effect on ideology. Ideologi-
cal distance from the assignor becomes more important in predicting assignment in politically
salient cases. The same justice will be slightly more likely (.02% = 1− exp(−.003)%) to get
an assignment in political salient cases. Thus, the ideological distance between the justices
and CJ Burger does matter substantively for opinion assignment in politically salient cases
holding everything else constant.
Moreover, the justice specific constants indicate the impact of unobserved factors, either
case or justice specific factors that are not accounted for in the model (Heiss, 2002, 229),
on average on the likelihood of getting an assignment compared to self-assignment. Since
almost all the coefficients for these constants are different from zero this indicates that this
model is missing justice specific variables or certain case specific variables that describe the
context and the nature of an assignment decision in a particular case. Clearly, this suggests
the need for more theoretical consideration and empirical research in this area. Nevertheless,
we have at least tested whether these unaccounted for factors might exist by including these
constants in the model. Even though they exist, as the significant coefficients suggest,
and despite the fact that we cannot model them directly, we achieve the important goal of
producing unbiased estimates. The MWS estimates in Table 1, however, remain biased since
the excluded constants are significantly different from 0.
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The coefficients of the CL model part indicate the overall impact of justice specific char-
acteristics on the likelihood of getting an assignment. For instance, if we take the equity
coefficient: the higher the number of associate justice assignments a justice receives the less
likely that justice is to get the assignment. Our estimates indicate that for one more assign-
ment from an associate justice, holding all other variables constant, the odds of getting the
assignments will decrease by 10% (1 − exp(−.110) = .10). Also we find that, holding ev-
erything else constant, the more expertise a justice has and the lower the justice’s workload
is, the more likely that justice is to get the assignment. Again, these interpretations only
depend on justice specific characteristics.
Besides the improved model fit – an almost 11% reduction in error of correctly predicted
cases over a best-guess null model – the important difference is that we get weaker statistical
support for the Majority Coalition Size Hypothesis because the associated standard errors
get much wider. Additionally, a likelihood-ratio test shows that controlling for Winning
Margin, the inclusion of the interaction of Winning Margin × Ideology does not significantly
improve the model fit (p > .08) casting further doubt on the authors’ Majority Coalition
Size Hypothesis.
To summarize this section, other than the non-findings for the Majority Coalition Size
Hypothesis, our results from using a correctly specified model produce less support for the
hypotheses put forward by MSW. We get particularly divergent results when interpreting
predicted probabilities associated with the interaction terms. We have made clear the extent
to which MSW’s findings are biased. In addition, a correct model specification makes trans-
parent several points that have not been previously detected. Our model shows that various
cases specific variables or personality factors describing the relationship between justices
on the court are missing from our theoretical models. While we do not have a theoretical
prediction for it, the data reveals an interesting working relationship between Burger and
Stevens that the original model would have pushed into the error term. Further theoretical
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consideration might shed more light on this particular relationship.
5. CONCLUSION
Choice models present useful tools to political scientists because of the frequency with which
we encounter limited dependent variables. Conditional logit models provide opportunities
to simultaneously consider the effects of independent factors of both the choices and the
choosers. Despite this usefulness, however, the requirements and assumptions of these models
must be fully contemplated when they are utilized. We believe that our discussion above
illustrates the specific hazards of using a CL model without consideration of an important
element of the model, namely choice-specific constants.
Formally, we have demonstrated that failure to include choice-specific constants will yield
biased results in conditional logit models. These models have to set up correctly in order to
yield unbiased estimates. Scholars should specify choice-specific constants and enter them
into the deterministic part of their models. This assures that the stochastic part of the model
has a zero mean, as assumed in these types of choice-models.
Substantively, we have demonstrated that in the context of Supreme Court opinion as-
signment, this same failure will lead to incorrect inference and prediction about the impact
of a variety of variables. We uncovered these problems by correctly specifying a CL model
to test the effects of not only choice-specific characteristics, but also chooser-specific charac-
teristics in a situation were the choice set is allowed to vary from observation to observation
or from respondent to respondent. We made transparent the bias in estimated coefficients
analyzing an example in judicial politics.
Our discussion should serve as a warning to researchers who seek to use these models in
their own work. It is imperative to include choice-specific constants to control for the non-
included, and often non-measurable, factors represented by the choices. Computationally,
15
the solution is costless, while the alternative, incorrect inference is costly.
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